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I  Introduction: The Neuroexistential Predicament 
 
Writing about the physiology of love, Melvin Konner (2002, p. 322) quotes the 
poet Sappho:  
     
               To me that man equals a god 
               as he sits before you and listens 
               closely to your sweet voice 
 
               and lovely laughter—which troubles 
               the heart in my ribs.  For now 
               as I look at you my voice fails,  
 
              my tongue is broken and thin fire 
              runs like a thief through my body. 
              My eyes are dead to light, my ears 
 
              pound, and sweat pours down over me.   
              I shudder, I am paler than grass, 
              and am intimate with dying… 
 
Of this poem written 2,500 years ago, Konner observes, ‘barbaric as it must seem to 
say it, these are signs of autonomic nervous-system turmoil’.  Konner describes his 
observation as ‘barbaric’ because, we believe, it pointedly reminds that even the 
profound experience of lost love can serve to remind of our neuroexistential 
predicament.   
 
Existentialisms are responses to a felt diminishing of our self image.  Previous 
existentialisms resulted from anxiety wrought by entertaining the thought that there is 
no god to give our lives meaning and purpose or to sanction our moral codes, as well 
as by confrontation with the iniquitous acts of violence that we and our fellows inflict 
upon one another (Flanagan and Barack 2010).  The first wave made it seem that in 
matters of meaning, purpose and morality, we are left to our own devices; the second, 
that we are not up to the task, at least not if we are to hold ourselves to what seem like 
minimal standards of decency.   
 
Neuroexistentialism is like prior existentialisms in that it is a response to a 
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specific threat to our self-image.  The threat elicits anxiety and, when that anxiety 
does not devastate us, attempts to respond constructively.  But, unlike prior 
existentialisms, here the anxiety is not directly precipitated by doubts about 
supernatural foundations or dire failures of polity.  Here the threat derives from the 
way in which contemporary neuroscience provides copious amounts of evidence to 




 century commentators on Darwin, like Teilhard de 
Chardin, and some Nobel Laureate precursors of 21
st
 century neuroscience, like 
Eccles, Penfield or Sperry, embraced metaphysical views that might leave room for a 
version of dualism which includes a soul, those views are made to seem increasingly 
quaint by the ever more sophisticated brain probes and mind analyses developed by 
contemporary neuroscientists and philosophers.  Even if it does not turn out to be the 
case that the mind is, literally, the brain, plausible alternative views of the mind-brain 
relationship—such as ‘mind is a function of the brain’ or ‘mind supervenes on the 
brain’—are no more likely to give comfort to those who wish to cling to a 
supernatural metaphysics.  For even these serious, alternative views evoke Laplace’s 
pithy response to those who wondered what role might be left for god to play in his 
theory about the formation of the solar system—‘I have no need for that hypothesis’.   
 
Applied to the matter at hand, if the intent is to explain human behavior without 
including extraneous variables, there is no need for a soul hypothesis.  Indeed, 
although there is much that distinguishes received views of scientific explanation 
from contemporary views, both take excluding the extraneous as fundamental.  
Hempel (1965, pp. 432-433), referring to collective subconscious and entelechies, 
emphasizes that ‘immunity to disconfirmation is…a fatal defect’.  Craver (2007, pp. 
36-37) developing a view of explanation suited to the mind-brain sciences, makes a 
similar point in speaking of the production of action potentials:  if neurons are 
blessed by an ordained person and then stimulated with a 10-nanoampere current for 
one second, an action potential is generated.  The current is determined relevant and 
the blessing not, because the current-action potential relationship is one that can be 
situated within the causal structure of the world.   
 
Of course the intent is not to deny that there are different ways of viewing the 
world.  In terms formulated by Sellars (1963), the ‘manifest’ image is distinct from 
the ‘scientific’ image: in other words, how things appear to us is not the same as how 
things really are.  Tables do not appear to be comprised of mostly empty space but, 
as a matter of fact, they are fields in Hilbert space—a quantum mechanical way of 
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saying that they are largely made up of empty space.   
 
Sellars was concerned with the scientific image in general, but neuroexistentialism 
is not a reaction to the quantum mechanical description of tables.  Rather it is a 
reaction to being told such things as, although it appears to me that my heart is broken, 
what I am actually experiencing is tumult in my autonomic nervous system.  
Neuroexistentialism is best thought of as a response to that part of the manifest image 
that concerns the nature of persons, what Flanagan (2002, pp. 27-56) calls the 
‘humanistic image’.   
 
The humanistic image then is a subset of the manifest image.  Although it 
derives from folk theories that have been formulated to explain how human beings 
appear to themselves, from the first-person perspective, it can be quite intricate and 
refined, due in part to having absorbed theological, philosophical, and some scientific 
notions. Indeed, the relationship between humanistic and scientific images can 
sometimes be quite equitable for in the sciences, especially the human sciences, it is 
commonplace to assume much that derives directly from the humanistic image.  The 
social and psychological sciences, for example, do not presuppose that we are 
automata; they presuppose that we are, somehow understood, agents capable of 
initiating actions.   
 
Since in some respects they draw upon one another, why is it not the case that they 
co-exist, harmoniously?  At least one clear reason for conflict is that scientific and 
humanistic images are not just abstractions that have no bearing on how we live our 
lives.  They are conceptual schemes that guide our choice of action in the world.  
What makes matters worse is that each wants to endorse its image as real, as true, as 
the right way to see things.  If research into the central nervous system and its 
interaction with endocrine, immune and other biological systems eventually reveals 
that nothing corresponds to a folk psychological or a philosophical description of, say, 
free will, then so much the worse for free will and its advocates.  But rare is the 
manifest image that retreats gently into the good night; most, instead, rage, rage 
against the dying of the light.   
 
Still, one might persist, why should the manifest image yield its ground?  If 
neuroscience discovers nothing that corresponds to free will, then perhaps instead of 
requiring that the manifest image give way, perhaps we should suspect that the 
methods of science simply are not up to the task of giving the manifest image its due.  
Although much could be said as regards this matter, we will confine ourselves to two 
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points.   
 
First, as discussed above, if the intent is to explain, the best models of explanation 
yet devised all take excluding the extraneous to be a desideratum.  At least where 
non-observables are concerned, if we have no need for a hypothesis that makes 
mention of them (free will, or god, or souls, or entelechies, or what-have-you), then 
they are better left unmentioned.  Second, allowing that manifest and scientific 
images are intimately related, as we have indicated above, does not necessarily work 
to the advantage of the manifest image.  Quine (1976, pp. 233-234), who also 
advocates a version of this idea—‘science is itself a continuation of common 
sense’—is instructive in this regard.  Both scientist and layperson begin with the 
same ‘primitive sense of evidence’, but science is more careful, more systematic, and 
more inclined to put nature to ‘embarrassing tests’.  In a word, by promoting high 
epistemic standards, it positions itself to ‘overrule’ the evidence adduced by those 
engaged in less rigorous reflection or inquiry into various aspects of the manifest 
image.  And, consistent with the consensus among those who have developed 
sophisticated models of explanation, Quine (1976, p. 234) too banishes the extraneous: 
scientists tend to look upon the simpler of two hypotheses ‘as not merely the more 
likeable, but the more likely’.  
 
Where does this leave us then?  Because historically questions of value and 
meaning have tended to be answered by appeals to theology or extravagant 
metaphysics, and because the scientific image leaves little or no room for either, 
conflict is inevitable.  Retreat to the answers of the past would be epistemologically 
irresponsible and indicate disrespect for the truth.  But if retreat is not an option, 
what sort of response might be compatible with the neuroexistential understanding of 
our predicament?  Flanagan (2007) has proposed ‘eudaimonics’, that is a type of 
empirical-normative inquiry into the nature, causes, and conditions of human 
flourishing or fulfillment.   
 
II. Eudaimonics  
 
Eudaimonics is consistent with ontological naturalisms that reject belief in 
supernatural forces and such dualisms as the bifurcation of humans and non-humans 
or the mind and body, but its main concern is not ontology (Flanagan et al. 2008, pp. 
5-9).  It is a type of ethical naturalism that is primarily concerned with the proper 
way of approaching moral inquiry.  Its principal, substantive, methodological 
commitment is that moral philosophy should not employ a distinctive a priori method 
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of yielding substantive, self-evident and foundational truths from pure conceptual 
analysis.  Among other things, this methodological commitment includes a rejection 
of Kant’s distinction between phenomena, which can be investigated by science, and 
noumena (self, will, laws of freedom etc.) which cannot.  Instead, it is committed to 
promoting fruitful interaction among ethical inquiry and certain other disciplines, in 
particular naturalized epistemology, psychology, and neuroscience.  In short, ethics 
should be studied in a way that is continuous with science and none of its claims 
should be shielded from empirical investigation.   
 
Given the goal of understanding human flourishing, which is taken to be partly 
constituted by a non-transcendental sense of meaning and purpose, how should one 
proceed?  Developing an idea of Quine’s, Flanagan (2002, pp. 265-319) has 
proposed that we proceed in a way analogous to investigations conducted in the 
applied sciences like engineering or ecology.  When building skyscrapers in 
earthquake-prone regions we are careful to specify the types of structure that should 
inform our designs and the types of materials that should be employed, if we keep in 
mind the goal of avoiding serious damage when earthquakes do occur.  When 
growing soybean, one should plant during seasons when nighttime temperatures 
seldom drop below 18 degrees centigrade and in regions that are rich with 
well-aerated, alluvial soils, if the goal is to produce healthy plants and maximum 
yields.  When raising children, promoting social change, or designing 
political-economic policies, the question then, for a student of eudaimonics, is what 
should be done, if the goal is to promote human flourishing in ways that do not appeal 
to supernatural or transcendental senses of meaning and purpose.   
 
Although both authors take the analogy to applied science seriously, eudaimonics 
(or, Eudaimonistic Scientia) would not fit Kuhn’s description of normal science.  But 
as with any science, eudaimonic inquiry often begins with hypotheses about what 
constitutes a healthy or a good person.  Key concepts can then be operationalized 
and experiments can be designed, thereby enabling the investigator to seek 
confirmation.  If hypotheses are disconfirmed, and methodology appears not to be at 
fault, the hypotheses may then be revised.  To reiterate a central tenet:  ethics 
should never be shielded from systematic, empirical inquiry.   
 
But clearly there is less of a consensus as regards how best to study human 
flourishing than there is for the objects of study in civil engineering or botany.  
Eudaimonics is perhaps best thought of as scientific—with a normative 
component—in the sense that William James’ writings on mind are thought of as 
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scientific.  Another way of saying this is that it is as a form of philosophical 
theorizing that is strongly continuous with science. Because the concept ‘flourishing’ 
remains rather inchoate—not unlike the concept ‘mind’ during the final decades of the 
19
th
 century—and because the tools most appropriate to its formal analyses and 
experimental investigations have not been identified with a sufficiently high degree of 
confidence, it is best thought of as a field that is methodologically pluralistic, in the 
way that fields which command the attention of both scientists and philosophers 
typically are.   
 
To say that the methodology is pluralistic and to allow that many tools of inquiry 
are borrowed is not to say that the methods or tools will not require modification and 
refinement as the field develops.  For example, consider Rawls’ method of 
‘reflective equilibrium’ (Flanagan 2007, pp. 111-145):  as applied to eudaimonics, 
first, one observes and reflects on lives that seem to go well, as well as those that do 
not, in order to produce a provisional idea of what counts as flourishing, eudaimonia.  
Second, keeping in mind the provisional idea, one investigates conditions in the world 
and characteristics of people that seem to contribute to or detract from flourishing.  
Third, in the process of investigating those conditions and characteristics, it is highly 
likely that the provisional idea of the object under investigation—eudaimonia—will 
be revised.  If reflective equilibrium is effective, the result should be a more mature 
conception of eudaimonia as well as an enhanced ability to discern the conditions and 
characteristics in virtue of which it is constituted.   
 
But the analogy to applied science and the appeal to a pluralistic methodology that 
includes practices like reflective equilibrium may lead one to worry that, at best, 
eudaimonics can lead only to a parochial ethics or worse, a form of pernicious 
relativism.  Consider what Flanagan (2007, 118-125) has called the ‘internalist 
objection’:  eudaimonics is an empirical-normative inquiry that tends to be carried 
out locally, from within a particular community and tradition.  Questions raised are 
importantly unlike purely empirical forms of inquiry, since there tend not to be 
obvious, universal facts of the matter that can be appealed to when seeking to 
adjudicate disputes.  If the question is whether planetary orbits are circular or 
elliptical, despite in principle worries motivated by the Duhem-Quine Thesis, in 
practice the scientific community is able to achieve a consensus as regards what is the 
case, without succumbing to parochialism or relativism.   
 
Things are not quite the same with eudaimonics.  Currently the only measure of 
what constitutes flourishing is in fact what norms are avowed and considered best, 
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from within a community.  The internalist objection is that once a group has settled 
on a certain conception of eudaimonia, practices and traditions which append to that 
conception are nearly guaranteed to structure the social environment in such a way 
that virtues and norms said to enable or constitute eudaimonia will be endorsed.  
Because those are the virtues and norms that are endorsed and because flourishing can 
only occur in particular times and places—so very much unlike, say, entropy, which 
seems to hold universally—the local consensus will make it true that to flourish one 
must abide by community practices and traditions.  But the manner in which local 
custom can prejudice the development of paths that promote flourishing is the 
problem—historically it has been the case that cultivation of the intellect, aesthetics, 
and civility have been restricted to a minority whose eudaimonia is made possible by 
the servitude of others, for whom eudaimonia is either denied or greatly restricted.  
And even among philosophers, who should be well practiced at the pursuit of 
reflective equilibrium, wickedness is not uncommon:  some have owned slaves, 
some have promoted racist ideologies, and some joined the Nazi Party.   
 
The internalist objection is well-founded, but it does not cripple eudaimonics.  A 
partial response, one which Flanagan (2007, pp. 122-148) has elsewhere developed in 
detail, is that one can ‘go external’:  that is, we should not rest content with reflective 
equilibrium (RE), we should aspire to ‘wide reflective equilibrium’ (WRE).  When 
misgivings about eudaimonia emerge, whether these derive from personal, intuitive 
discomfort, from conflicts within a community, or from conflicts between distinct 
communities, WRE enjoins us to reflect widely, to seriously consider credible 
alternatives.  WRE implies that we distinguish ‘subjective’ from ‘objective’ 
flourishing.  For the former it is enough that one’s virtues and norms pass local tests 
for RE; one need only be deemed good vis-à-vis the norms of a given community.  
But the norms regulating objective flourishing include an all-things-considered clause.  
In other words, to be found genuinely virtuous, one must pass tests for WRE, which is 
always a work-in-progress, but at least a work that makes possible ethical progress, by 
promoting reflection on all credible options, whenever there are misgivings about 
norms, values, or virtues, and when internal scrutiny fails to yield satisfactory 
solutions.   
 
What do we stand to learn from the empirical-normative inquiry that is 
eudaimonics?  As for the empirical, first, we know that evolutionary dispositions 
(e.g. those related to compassion, resentment, anger, and disgust) cum socialization 
can cause us to feel strong moral convictions, some of which are genuinely virtuous, 
and some of which, not.  Second, we know that attribution biases often lead people 
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to believe false things, e.g. perseverance biases will lead people to think they are 
proficient or deficient at tasks, even after they are told that data which motivated 
initial judgments were fabrications.  Combining (1) and (2) we know, inter alia, that 
once people are set in their ways, even if those ways are wicked, change will not 
come easily.  In short, achieving moral insight and channeling it so that it motivates 
changes in attitude and behavior.   
 
As for the normative, the truism that an ‘ought’ cannot be deduced from an ‘is’ 
notwithstanding, given that moral conflicts arise and given that we sometimes feel 
ill-at-ease with the implications of our moral intuitions, (1) and (2) suggest that we 
should avow and inculcate certain meta-norms.  One among these, the key 
meta-norm (KMN), states that when conflicts arise we should engage in the process of 
WRE.  Another, the intuition-checking meta-norm (ICMN), states that when we feel 
ill-at-ease we should reflect carefully on those intuitions and assess the degree of 
confidence we have in them.   
 
We realize that this sketch of eudaimonics raises at least as many questions as it 
answers.  It does no more than provide a loose, very general framework for how to 
think about ethical matters.  But rather than attempting to fill in the details here, we 
will instead seek to address a more fundamental problem.  Just what sort of universal 
orientation are we presupposing that might be sufficient to cause people to embrace 
meta-norms like KMN and ICMN as components of any attempt to live meaningfully 
and to flourish, and how might that be studied empirically.   
 
III. Platonism and its empirical implications 
 
Fitness is a prerequisite for the achievement of eudaimnonia.  Our cognitive and 
affective capacities must at least be sufficient to ‘satisfice’, as Herbert Simon would 
say.  We need not maximize material comfort, but we need to satisfy certain minimal 
standards for water, nutrition, and protection against the elements.  What’s more, if 
our species is to survive, we need opportunities to procreate.   
 
The additional claim advanced here, motivated by philosophical reflection on 
human nature and social life as both reveal themselves universally and over time, is 
that while working to be and remain biologically fit, humans tend to seek meaning in 
a way that conforms to a pattern recognized by Plato.  Wherever human beings seek 
to flourish, wherever and whenever they do so, they evince deep structural features as 
well shared criteria for measuring success.  The normative claim advanced here is 
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properly construed as a hypothetical imperative (Flanagan 2007, pp. 38-61):  If 
human beings are able to satisfice and if we begin to seek ways of living meaningfully, 
then (a) we should seek what Plato called ‘the good’, ‘the true’, and ‘the beautiful’ 
and (b) we should measure success by the degree to which these are achieved, (c) in a 
maximally harmonious way.   
 
Since we are advocates of naturalism, invoking Plato here might strike some 
readers as inconsistent, for he construed the good, the true, and the beautiful as 
‘Eidos’, forms existing as immaterial phenomena.  Concerning this though, we part 
company with Plato, for there is a perfectly naturalistic way of discussing the Platonic 
triumvirate.  Even mathematicians who, more so than other members of the scientific 
community, have sometimes seemed to describe the objects of their study in terms 
consistent with Plato’s view of the forms, now tend more toward a naturalistic view of 
their endeavors.  Although it is true that mathematicians often develop fields of 
study that apparently refer only to a world of abstractions, this capability is 
explainable as a tendency to invent concepts by abstracting away from elements of the 
natural world, elements to which we have perceptual access (Livio 2010).  Even the 
geometry that was familiar to Plato is explainable as having been derived from our 
perfectly natural expertise at perceiving edges, at distinguishing between straight and 
curved lines, and at recognizing certain shapes, like circles and ellipses.   
 
To grasp how this Platonic triumvirate can be compatible with naturalism, imagine 
it in Darwinian terms.  Mother Nature has selected for parents who care about their 
young, who reliably detect the location of food and water, who choose partners with 
symmetrical faces (as a guide to producing good babies), and who are sensitive to 
natural cycles (so to better prepare for changes in illumination and the seasons).  
Eventually, expansive containers of multifarious things—so including much more 
than just caring for the young, detecting consumables, and identifying suitable mates 
or significant temporal changes—that are thought to be good, true, and beautiful come 
to exist in the social world.  Then, just as was the case with creating geometry in 
ways that were grounded in and compatible with our natural perceptual capacities, 
human communities expanded upon and articulated the platonic triumvirate.  To a 
first approximation, ethics and politics can be thought of as tracking the good, art and 
music as tracking the beautiful, and science and mathematics, the true.   
 
We are not intending to deny that, as a matter of fact, hedonists, egoists, 
amoralists, or immoralists may never seek to flourish in the way we describe.  But 
we are claiming that, as life’s end approaches, if they express misgivings about how 
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they have lived, it will be because the platonic orientation matters to them and they 
are realizing too late just how much it matters.  A eudaimon, one who lives in accord 
with the platonic, hypothetical imperative, will not engage in second-guessing at the 
approach of death.   
 
Obviously we are not able to claim to have adduced adequate empirical support 
for our position.  But we do believe there is adequate evidence to propose the 
platonic orientation as (a) a phenomenon in need of explanation, (b) as a framework 
capable of explaining why certain intra- and inter-personal tensions obtain, and (c) as 
the basis for a normative stance concerning how one should live.  As regards (a), if 
we are correct that human beings have a platonic orientation, then psychology, 
evolutionary psychology, cognitive and affective neuroscience, and social 
neuroscience need to begin seeking to explain how and why we are constituted in this 
way.  As regards (b), if we are correct that certain all-too-human anxieties and 
conflicts derive from failures to achieve a properly integrated platonic triumvirate, 
then what we learn from (a) will enable us to better explain these anxieties and 
conflicts.  And, as regards (c), if (b) achieves explanatory adequacy, then we would 
have good reason to make recommendations—in the spirit of ethics as human 
ecology—concerning how individuals and communities should lead their lives, if they 
want to flourish.   
 
To suggest how psychology, evolutionary psychology, cognitive and affective 
neuroscience and social neuroscience might begin to engage these issues, we draw 
upon a body of experimental work that has been motivated by Terror Management 
Theory (Hayes, et al. 2010).  Terror Management Theory (TMT) begins with the 
observation that like all animals we are designed to preserve our existence, but that 
unlike other animals we can project the future and be consciously aware that death is 
inevitable.  TMT then conjectures that the desire to preserve life coupled with the 
awareness of inevitable mortality creates an existential dilemma that can induce 
paralyzing anxiety, or ‘terror’.  TMT further conjectures that we do not seem to be 
morosely obsessed with anticipations of death, a phenomenon that it explains with 
reference to our commitment to worldviews, broad systems of belief regarding the 
nature of reality, which are able to quell anxiety in several ways.  In particular, 
according to Hayes et al. (2010, p. 700), a worldview ‘manages death anxiety by 
providing meaning and purpose to life by delineating how life should be lived…it 
provides a basis for the feeling that one has personal significance and value (i.e. 
self-esteem)’.  And when thoughts of death are unavoidable, religious or secular 
worldviews imbue us with a sense that either we will literally endure in an afterlife or 
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that something of which we are an integral part, e.g. a nation-state or ethnic group, 
will endure.   
 
Self-esteem then is achieved through commitment to a humanly constructed 
worldview and ‘meeting or exceeding the standards of value associated with the social 
role one plays within that worldview’ (Pyszczynski et al. 2004).  Experimental work 
that is motivated by TMT often manipulates thoughts of death in accord with the 
Mortality Salience (MS) hypothesis.  Succinctly, the MS hypothesis predicts that 
reminding participants in an experiment of their mortality will increase their need for 
self-esteem, hence commitment to their worldview.  ‘Worldview defense’ is a 
common reaction in such circumstances:  participants tend to indicate more negative 
reactions to those who disparage their worldview and more positive reactions to those 
who uphold their worldview.   
 
In formal tests of the MS hypothesis, participants are induced to think of death by 
being asked either open-ended questions—e.g. ‘jot down, as specifically as you can, 
what you think will happen to you as you physically die’ ((Pyszczynski et al. 2004, p. 
439)—or questions that require a yes-no response—e.g. ‘I am afraid of a painful 
death’ (Quirin et al. 2011).  Typically reactions to MS questions are compared to 
reactions induced by questions concerning other types of unpleasant events, say, 
thoughts about pain, in order to verify that results are not just reflecting a general 
response to anxiety, but that they are specifically related to reminders of death.  
Recent fMRI studies evince a pattern of activity that is distinct from generalized 
anxiety:  for example (Quirin et al. 2011), thoughts about mortality, when contrasted 
with thoughts about pain, correlate with significantly greater activation in the right 
amygdala, the left anterior cingulate, and the caudate nucleus.  Activation in the 
amydala and the anterior cingulate may be indicators of anxiety in response to the 
threat of mortality.  Activation in the caudate nucleus may be an indicator of seeking 
refuge in habitual behaviors or automatic thoughts, in other words behaviors and 
thoughts that require no innovation; they can be derived from or based upon a 
pre-existing, prevailing worldview.  Resorting to the habitual and the automatic is a 
common response to anxiety.  Proponents of TMT argue that these patterns of 
activation support the MS hypothesis in that (a) this anxiety seems to be specific to 
thoughts of death and, (b) thought and behavioral reactions to anxiety are consistent 
with claim that mortality salience inclines us to ‘defend’ our worldview.   
 
A separate fMRI study of existential anxiety probes the neurocognitive 
mechanisms involved in the processing of death-related linguistic cues (Han et al. 
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2010).  One among their hypotheses is that processing of these cues correlates with 
modulation of activity in the insula, which has recently been heralded as the neural 
substrate of the ‘sentient self’—a coherent representation of all one’s feelings in the 
nonce (Craig 2010).  Evidence for this role that has been attributed to the insula 
derives from many studies, among them being studies which reveal increased 
activation in the anterior insula when subjects’ emotions are engaged by stimuli that 
are highly self-relevant.  But death, though engaging the emotions, is exceptional.  
Activation in the insula decreases.   
 
How might these tentative experimental probes of existential anxiety relate to our 
claim that eudaimons, people who live in accord with the platonic, hypothetical 
imperative, will not engage in second-guessing at the approach of death?  First, since 
they have no misgivings, death or the suggestion of death might well induce less 
anxiety, hence less activation in the amygdala and the anterior cingulate.  Second, 
since eudaimons, by definition, care deeply about what is true, they will be less likely 
to see refuge in habitual behaviors or automatic thoughts; hence, the caudate nucleus 
is less likely to exhibit high levels of activation.  Third, when processing 
death-related linguistic cues, there should be less need to avoid thinking of these cues 
as related to self; hence, the anterior insula is more likely to maintain normal levels of 
activation.   
 
Obviously we are aware that neither is our formulation of the hypothetical 
imperative clear enough nor are these experimental probes sophisticated enough for 
us to claim anything more than that neuroexistentialism is, perhaps, ready to begin 
taking its first steps as a type of applied science.  It goes without saying that 
obstacles are many:  to begin with, TMT, which has been scouting some of this 
terrain, with an experimental methodology, for twenty-five years, faces serious 
challenges from its critics (Kirkpatrick and Navarrete 2006).  But even if we are 
unable to persuade the reader of our claims as regards the Platonic orientation, we 
hope at least to have shown that philosophical reflection over and scientific 
investigation into matters existential can inter-animate one another.   
 
As for the Platonic orientation though, one way of stating our view is that we are 
giving a qualified endorsement of Nietzsche’s position—‘he who has a why to live 
can bear with any how’.   We say that our endorsement is ‘qualified’, because it is 
not literally the case that just ‘any how’ is sufficient for life, for fitness.  Here 
Nietzsche is just speaking hyperbolically.  Our second and more significant 
qualification is that we claim that it is not that case that any ‘why’ can promote 
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flourishing.  Instead, it is ‘why’ understood as successful pursuit of and integration 
of the good, the true and the beautiful that best promotes human flourishing.   
 
Some might believe that eudaimonics, conceived in this way, is destined to either 
failure or to compromise of a pernicious sort.  Among other things, Plato did not 
foresee that commitment to what is true would yield modern science and technology.  
This would not be so bad, but for the fact that science and technology sometimes 
conflict with the good and the beautiful.  Copernican and Darwinian revolutions, 
along with modern neuroscience, have undermined certain aesthetically-pleasing, 
invocations to be good.  Plato’s story of the creation of the cosmos in the Timaeus, 
though beautifully written, simply is not true; the ‘divine quest’ to live ethically and 
meaningfully in a way that approximates the way that is ‘worthy of the gods’ has been 
shown to be just a fatuous wish.   
 
The Platonic orientation that we recommend is one that privileges truth.  If 
conceptions of the good, the true and the beautiful are not compatible, then one must 
choose.  And the path to flourishing, we recommend, is a path that chooses truth 
before all else.  Thinking about our natures and our lives in ways that incorporate 
superstition and wishful thinking is childish and unbecoming to rational social 
animals like us.  Beyond being childish though, it would diminish us in many other 
ways as well, depriving us of self-respect, integrity and authenticity; in a word, it 
would be corrupting (Lynch 2004, p. 143 and Wood 2008, p. 13).  But some 
empirical investigations of human psychology seem to suggest that we are better off if 
we allow for believing things that are not true.  In the next section, we address this 
worry to see whether or not it constitutes an obstacle to our view of ethical inquiry 
and to our vision of eudaimonics.   
 
IV. Positive Illusions and Tertullian Beliefs 
 
Stich (2006, pp. 392-393) has recently written that ‘in some very significant 
situations, having false beliefs leads to better outcomes than having true beliefs…if 
you have false beliefs you live longer and have a higher quality of life.’  It surely 
seems as though he is speaking of ‘outcomes’ that are importantly relevant to 
flourishing.  Indeed, this issue has previously been addressed by Flanagan (2007, pp. 
168-182).  It is undeniable that, in aggregate, people tend to harbor many false 
beliefs.  The question though is whether human beings could live without them and 
compensate for any belief formation mechanisms that contribute to false belief 
proliferation, without undermining eudaimonia.  Our response is both yes and no:  
 15 
human beings do have a tendency to form and harbor false ‘beliefs’ but, strictly 
speaking, ‘beliefs’ of this type that contribute to human flourishing are not beliefs, as 
such.   
 
We should first make it clear that we are not, here, taking a position on the nature 
of beliefs, per se.  A majority of analytic philosophers who concern themselves with 
belief advocate some version of the idea that beliefs ‘aim at the truth’ (Williams 1973, 
pp. 137-138).  Davidson (2003, pp. 366-367) emphasizes their ‘veridical nature’; 
Searle (2001, pp. 37-38) claims it is their ‘job to represent how things are’; Railton 
(2003, p. 297) holds that a belief ‘not only represents its propositional content as true’, 
it ‘cannot represent itself as unresponsive to…truth’; Crane (2001, p. 103) says that 
‘holding true’ is a synonym for belief; Wedgwood (2002, p. 273) observes that ‘for 
every proposition p that one consciously considers, the best outcome is to believe p 
when p is true’; and, Shah and Velleman (2005, pp. 498-500) contend that beliefs are 
‘truth-regulated acceptance’.  We think these views are problematic (Lane 2010) but, 
as far as eudaimonics is concerned, what matters is not whether beliefs generally tend 
to aim at the truth.  What matters is whether, as a matter of fact, false beliefs and 
belief regulation that aims away from the truth contribute to human flourishing.   
 
Let us begin by considering a life-threatening, existential predicament:  imagine 
a medical doctor (or scientist, or scholar) who is quite convinced, on extremely good 
evidence, that neither alternative medicines nor prayer can cure mesothelioma cancer.  
Indeed let us suppose he believes prayer to be nothing more than a superstitious 
practice, suitable only for those who are afraid of the dark, as Stephen Hawking is 
wont to say.  We think most readers will not find it far-fetched to claim that if the 
doctor receives the results of his own biopsy and that these indicate he has contracted 
an especially aggressive form of the disease for which median survival is less than six 
months, he might avail himself of various alternative medicines and turn to prayer.   
 
How should we explain such behavior?  Were we to employ propositional 
attitude, belief-desire, psychology toward explaining the consultations with CAM 
(complementary and alternative medicine) and religious specialists, there would be no 
trouble with identifying the relevant desire—prolongation of life.  But then what is 
the specific content of the belief?  To say that he believes these consultations will 
help cure his cancer, ex hypothesi, would be inaccurate.   And it is not clear just 
what attitude could, both accurately and without loss of explanatory adequacy, be 
substituted for belief.   
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What seems to be problematic about the role of belief in this explanatory sketch is 
that holding beliefs about the relationship between mesothelioma cancer and CAMS 
or prayer is not especially difficult, unless it is oneself who is afflicted.  Belief 
attribution is often asymmetrical; propositions that we think others should believe are 
not necessarily those that we believe, at least not if the implications for self are grave.  
Maintaining a dubious attitude toward a proposition—e.g. neither CAMS nor prayer 
are salubrious—requires energy (Gilbert 1993), which can be sapped when a person is 
dealing with existential anxiety.  Research also indicates that stress and uncertainty 
incline people to resort to superstition (Keinan 2002), perhaps due in part to 
stress-induced lowering of blood glucose levels (Galliot et al. 2007).  In short, 
people tend to enjoy a number of false beliefs about self, many of which have been 
studied under the rubric, ‘positive illusions’ (Flanagan 2007, pp. 168-182 and Lane 
2010, pp. 602-613). 
 
Positive illusions have been variously described and classified but, according to 
one of the better known sets of studies, one of particular importance to eudaimonics, 
they include self-aggrandizing perceptions, illusions of control, and unrealistic 
optimism (Taylor and Brown 1988, 1994).  Concerning self-aggrandizement, the 
‘better-than-most’ effect, Taylor and Brown observe that is nearly impossible for any 
one to be warranted in holding such beliefs.  As regards illusions of control, the 
claim is not that people believe themselves capable of exercising control over that 
which clearly exceeds their reach; rather, they tend to evince a moderate distortion 
concerning things over which they are in fact able to exert some control.  And, as 
regards unrealistic optimism, they point to the voluminous body of literature, 
including studies of self-deception (Mele 1997 and 2001), which indicates that most 
people are unrealistically optimistic in believing their future will be better than can be 
justified on statistical grounds.   
 
Even when people are provided with accurate, relevant base rate information, they 
tend to cling to unwarranted beliefs.  Pronin (2008) has discovered that these beliefs 
tend to be refractory to correction, especially when those beliefs concern self, in the 
present moment.  Subjects can be presented with an explicit description of a bias, a 
description that indicates the bias is a common human tendency—immediately after 
acting in accord with that bias—and yet still fail to see themselves as liable.   
 
Being refractory though is not necessarily a bad thing.  Positive illusions can lead 
to higher motivation, greater persistence, and increased likelihood of success (Armor 
and Taylor 2003), effects which seem to be universal (Acker and Duck 2008, Church 
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et al. 2006).  Such illusions also appear to promote use of efficient problem-solving 
strategies.  People with conviction are more likely to succeed than are those who 
lack conviction—albeit not nearly so likely as they believe, after all these are illusions.  
Sometimes it might even take an illusion, just to predispose a person to taking action, 
doing something rather than nothing:  Tiger argues (1999, pp. 615-619) that positive 
illusions are essential to overcoming our cognitive ability ‘to generate endlessly 
discouraging predictions of the pitfalls of any action’.  He avers that we are endowed 
with a ‘cognitive override…a moderate design defect of pure reason’, something that 
overrides ‘cognitive literalness’, thereby biasing ‘the odds in favor of action’.  
 
But more is involved than just action priming and performance enhancement.  
Some evidence suggests that positive illusions are adaptive for both mental and 
physical health (Alloy and Abramson 2007, Taylor and Brown 1988, 1994).  Some 
people seem not to have positive illusions:  they remember both good and bad 
self-relevant information with equal frequency; their evaluations of self and others are 
congruent; and, their self-appraisals generally coincide with appraisals produced by 
impartial observers.  These people without positive illusions tend to be low in 
self-esteem, moderately depressed, or both.  It is sometimes said of them that their 
beliefs bespeak a ‘depressive realism’.  Where ‘well-adjusted’ people, for example, 
are not expert at judging their control over events, depressive realists are. 
 
As for physical health, first, studies of AIDS patients reveal that those who believe 
they can control the disease and prevent its recurrence, those who do not ‘realistically’ 
accept or appraise their condition, both exhibit a longer asymptomatic period and live 
longer (by an average of nine months) than those who do realistically accept or 
appraise their condition (Taylor et al. 2000).  Among other things, it seems to be the 
case that those who foster positive illusions are able to maintain a higher level of CD4 
T helper cells.  Second, these studies of AIDS patients, along with studies of breast 
cancer patients, show that eventual disconfirmation of erroneous beliefs does not have 
harmful consequences.  Third, what is true of the sick, is also true of the healthy 
(Taylor et al. 2003):  while undergoing stress tests in a laboratory setting, people 
with positive illusions exhibit milder cardiovascular responses, quicker recovery, and 
lower baseline cortisol levels.   
 
These studies dovetail with research on the placebo effect, salubrious effects that 
follow administration of pharmacologically inert substances or physiologically 
inactive treatments.  Although awareness of placebo effectiveness is not new, PET 
and other technologies have made it possible to begin identifying its neural substrates, 
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which are distinct from the substrates implicated when active substances or treatments 
are administered (Mayberg et al. 2002).  Indeed there are even hierarchies of 
effectiveness: e.g. injections are more effective than pills, and incisions more effective 
than injections (Evans 2004).  Placebos have been demonstrated to be effective in 
the treatment of many conditions, including:  pain, swelling, addiction, 
cardiovascular and respiratory problems, peptic ulcers, depression, anxiety, cancer, 
and Parkinson’s disease (Benedetti 2008).  Some of the mechanisms whereby these 
false beliefs—that one has been given a pill or a treatment that can itself precipitate 
healing—wield their effectiveness include the release of endogenous opioids or 
dopamine, the inhibition of serotonin uptake, the reduction of β-adrenergic heart 
activity, as well as the conditioning of immune receptors like lymphocytes and 
hormones like cortisol.   
 
Collectively these data seem to indicate that our advocacy of platonic eudaimonia 
that privileges truth is ill-advised.  Positive illusions and placebos, in other words, 
false beliefs, seem to promote enhanced performance, well-being, healing, health 
maintenance, even the favoring of action over inaction.  Perhaps then we should 
allow that certain types of false belief are an exception.   But we think the data do 
not suggest that beliefs, properly understood, have these effects.   
 
First, recall that what is special about these ‘beliefs’ is that they are about self, not 
the external world, per se.  Even for the case of placebo effectiveness beliefs are 
self-related—X will assist my recovery.  Second, to invoke the ‘beliefs aim at the 
truth’ formulation, note that these ‘beliefs’ are not aimed erratically.  They aim away, 
but strategically so.  False ‘beliefs’ that have been demonstrated to have positive 
effects are, without exception, about a corner of the world with which they are in 
direct causal contact.  That is, assuming that these beliefs are realized in virtue of 
particular types of neural activity—which is what our naturalism assumes—they are 
about a part of the world with which they can be in direct causal contact, say, the 
neural mechanisms in virtue of which we regulate hormones like cortisol.   
 
Humphrey (2004; see also Beauregard, p. 233) has speculated that the 
mechanisms which are activated by placebos are activated by means of a mind-body 
‘lingua franca’.  At the current stage of understanding, this lingua franca is just a 
theoretical posit, one whose function is fairly well understood, but one whose neural 
substrate is largely unknown.   What we are proposing is an expansion of the lingua 
franca’s scope such that it includes not only placebo ‘beliefs’ but also ‘beliefs’ that 
cluster under the rubric of positive illusions.   
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Consider that most effective medical treatments, including those motivated by the 
pathogenic theory of medicine, are little more than a century old.  In lieu of 
demonstrably effective treatments, to avail oneself of shamanic incantations and 
rituals would be reasonable.  But at least for those shamanic treatments which did no 
obvious harm, it would not have been worthwhile to conduct systematic evaluations, 
including careful consideration of instances of failure.  If Plato could not foresee the 
advent of modern science, one could hardly expect such prescience from humans of 
the Pleistocene Era.  Epigenetic rules that favored credulity over skepticism—with 
regard to self-related beliefs—may well have evolved as an effective adaptive 
strategy.   
 
Quine (1994, p. 66) once wrote:  ‘Creatures inveterately wrong in their 
inductions have a pathetic but praise-worthy tendency to die before reproducing their 
kind’.  We are saying that Quine is wrong, with respect that is to a certain set of 
self-related ‘beliefs’.  Quine’s error is commonplace, even among evolutionary 
biologists, who pay more attention to ‘ecological’ than to ‘co-adaptations’ (Arthur 
2004, pp. 117-127).  The former are adaptations to the external environment; the 
latter, to the internal.   
 
An ecological adaptation is exemplified by forest fly adaptation to increases in 
ambient temperature.  Flies must struggle to stave off desiccation:  the hotter it gets, 
the faster they lose water.  Because the larger a creature, the smaller is its surface 
area relative to volume and because water loss occurs at the body’s surface, in a hot, 
dry environment, bigger is better.  Selective pressure then leads to an increase in the 
average body size of the fly population.  Because the fitness enhancement is 
precipitated by something in the creature’s environment—temperature change—this 
counts as an external adaptation.  But suppose that in addition to differing by body 
size, these flies also differ in how wings are connected to thorax.  Further suppose 
that the wing-thorax joint affects flying ability.  Under such circumstances the 
population will evolve toward enhanced joint integration.  Here though selection is 
mostly an internal matter:  flying does occur in environments but the main impetus 
for this specific change is the need for adjustment between parts internal to the 
organism.   
 
Creatures must adapt to the external world, but they must also adapt to the internal 
world.  Among other things, creatures like us must deal with the existential problem 
that Atran (2003) has termed the ‘tragedy of cognition’:  we can meta-represent self 
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and others, project the future, and envision the demise of all we care about.  This 
capacity for meta-representation is—along with temperature change—part of the 
environment to which we must adapt.  It appears to be the case that part of our 
adaptation to this internal, existential problem has been our mind-body lingua franca.   
 
We believe that the lingua franca comprises self-related ‘beliefs’ that are best 
understood not as beliefs per se; instead, they are an amalgam of belief and desire 
(Lane 2010).  To a first approximation the metaphor ‘direction-of-fit’ can be 
employed to capture the distinction between this amalgam and ordinary beliefs 
(Searle 2001, pp. 37-38).  Most beliefs exhibit a mind-to-world direction of fit; in 
other words, these beliefs are shaped so to represent the world, as it is.  Desires, on 
the other hand, exhibit a world-to-mind direction of fit; they represent not how things 
are in the world, but how we would like them to be.  The amalgam of which we 
speak is a distinct attitude in that its purpose is to represent the world, but it 
simultaneously represents how we would like the world to be.  So, as with the case 
of positive illusions, I ‘believe’ that I am more capable than I really am, but in virtue 
of holding such a belief, I position myself to enhance actual performance, which can 
be done because self-related ‘beliefs’ are confined to a corner of the world with which 
they are in causal contact.   
 
We dub these ‘beliefs’ Tertullian beliefs, or t-beliefs.  ‘Tertullian’ seems to be a 
proper eponym because it is said, apocryphally, that he proclaimed ‘I believe it 
because it is absurd’ (Ayers 1979, pp. 7-8).  What he actually wrote, in the context of 
discussing Christian faith in Christ’s resurrection is, ‘it is by all means to be believed, 
because it is absurd…the fact is certain, because it is impossible’.  The idea of 
believing because it is ‘absurd’ or ‘impossible’, though hyperbolic, evinces the 
deliberateness of aiming away from the truth.  What matters is not that t-beliefs are 
false; what matters is that they seem calibrated to be false about a select set of 
phenomena, and only in certain ways and to a certain degree.  The deliberateness is 
suggestive of design.   
 
Others have written of possible belief-desire amalgams (Blackburn 1998, pp. 
97-100) or beliefs that exhibit ‘discordant behavior’ (Gendler 2008).  But what they 
have missed is this distinctive capacity exhibited by t-beliefs—the capacity to change 
the way the world is.  And some might question whether there is a need to introduce 
t-belief as a distinct attitude, for perhaps it is just what we typically mean when 
speaking of hope.  But hope seems to be ambiguous between belief and desire 
(Bresnitz 1999, p. 629), not an amalgam.  Hope in the sense of ‘hopeful’ is nothing 
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more than belief in a better future, while ‘I hope’ seems synonymous with ‘I desire’ or 
‘I want’.   
 
Provisionally, we think it appropriate to regard t-belief as an adaptation.  We are 
very much aware that what we are able to say about t-beliefs is far from an ideal 
adaptation explanation (Brandon 1990, Polger and Flanagan 2002).  We are, however, 
(1) able to give an ecological account of relative adaptedness, to explain how t-beliefs 
enhance fitness.  (2) There is evidence from the study of positive illusions to suggest 
that t-believing is a universal trait.  (3) It is also possible to say something about the 
mechanisms involved, by adducing evidence that shows placebo-induced changes 
markedly differ from changes induced by pharmacologically or physiologically active 
treatments.  And, (4) it is not a trivial point to observe that t-beliefs can only enhance 
fitness, and not diminish fitness, if they are carefully calibrated.  Erratic aiming of 
beliefs would result in the ‘praise-worthy tendency to die before reproducing’ our 
kind.  In short, the degree of care taken in calibration also suggests that t-beliefs 
might be the result of design by natural selection. 
 
But whether t-beliefs are better thought of as adaptations or as by-products (cf. 
McKay and Kennett 2009), does not significantly affect our defense of a eudaimonics 
that prioritizes truth.  In either case, they show that apparent counter-examples to our 
position, e.g. positive illusions, are not, properly speaking, beliefs.  They are 
t-beliefs, an amalgam of belief and desire that can promote both fitness and 
flourishing because they strategically aim at a corner of the world wherein they are 
able to be causally efficacious, despite the fact that they represent the world in a way 
that is not veracious.   
 
None of what we record here is intended to deny that systems of false belief seem 
to proliferate at an alarming rate.  What Lane (2010) has elsewhere referred to as the 
Conservation of Credulity Principle seems to hold everywhere:  as soon as one 
system of false beliefs begins to loose its hold, another emerges to take its place.  
France, for example, has experienced an ever dwindling supply of Roman Catholic 
clergy.  According to tax authorities the number is down to 36,000 (Kahane and 
Cavender 2002, p. 137), while the number of professional astrologers has steadily 
increased, such that there are now 40,000.   
 
What stance should an empirical-normative inquiry like eudaimonics take toward 
this phenomenon?  One possible response is to treat systems of false belief as 
reservoirs that can be drawn upon for the expression of certain aesthetic or moral 
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virtues.  Recall that the Platonic orientation, while privileging truth, is also 
committed to pursuit of the beautiful and the good.  Some systems of belief are 
expressed in ways that they can serve as models worthy of aesthetic appreciation and 
moral cultivation.  Others are less worthy.  We should be selective among these 
systems and foster those that are worthy, viz. compatible with the Platonic orientation.  
If given a choice between the King James Bible and Mein Kampf, a eudaimon would 
favor King James.   
 
Furthermore, note that attending to and cultivating our aesthetic and moral 
inclinations need not come at the cost of sacrificing truth.  As Flanagan (2007, pp. 
183-197) has emphasized, to express is one thing, to assert, another.  Creation stories, 
for example, can be appreciated for their beauty, admired for their depiction of ideals, 
and embraced as a way of making the universe seem meaningful, not simply as an 
inexplicable given.  What eudaimonics does not allow is the treatment of such stories 
as assertions:  that is, as propositions, as statements evaluable in terms of the ‘true’ 
and the ‘false’.  But even when stories are not taken to be true, they can be found, as 
a matter of fact, to be inspiring or uplifting; they can help us to transcend a narrow, 
local, occluded view of the world.  Stories about carpenters from Nazareth or young 
boys from Hannibal who take flight down the Mississippi River, can promote a 
platonic orientation without being taken as literally true.   
 
There is a philosophical curio known as Moore’s Paradox.  The idea is that the 
assertion of p seems to imply the belief that p.  Accordingly, it would be 
self-contradictory to proclaim ‘p but I don’t believe that p’, if the proclamation of p is 
regarded as an assertion.  Since self-contradiction is not truth-conducive, we do not 
advocate it.  But we do advocate, in some circumstances, that people should express 
p, while not believing that p.   
 
As applied to positive illusions and placebos, one might say ‘expressing p’ can be 
interpreted as a way of saying I believe that a certain belief is beneficial, even though 
I do not actually believe it (cf. Flanagan 2007, p. 193).  In other words, we can form 
second-order beliefs about beliefs to the effect that even when we clearly know the 
first-order belief to be false, we can believe that taking it to be true would be good for 
us.  Can such a notion as this be operationalized and linked to the claims made on 
behalf of t-belief’s causal efficacy?  There is some evidence to suggest so.    
 
It is almost universally assumed that for a placebo to be effective, the patient must 
actually believe in its efficacy.  But a recent study of the use of placebos in treatment 
 23 
of irritable bowl syndrome challenges this presumption.  Kaptchuk et al. (2010, p. 6) 
provide data to support the claim that placebo effectiveness can be harnessed ‘without 
deception’, if the following conditions are satisfied:  subjects (1) are provided with 
an accurate description of what is known about placebo effectiveness, (2) are 
encouraged to suspend disbelief, (3) are instructed to foster a positive, albeit realistic, 
expectancy, and (4) are directed to adhere to the medical ritual of pill taking.  In 
effect, Kaptchuk et al. seem to be trying to find a way to engage our expressive 
capacities and substitute them for belief.   
 
Eudaimonics of the kind we advocate is platonic.  Here we have tried to show 
that this view is plausible, that it is compatible with neuroscience, that parts of it can 
already be operationalized, and that it can be pursued without compromising on the 
pursuit of truth.  In advocating a privileged status for truth though, we do not intend 
to deny the actual role that false beliefs play in our world.  Confronted by this fact, 
what eudaimonics recommends is thus:  whereof one cannot assert, thereof one is 
still free to express.   
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